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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030332-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions on two counts of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Should this Court reject defendant's unpreserved discovery claims 
alleging that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion where 
defendant cannot show that the evidence should have been produced 
under either Brady or rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
This Court "'review[s] rulings on motions for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct [i.e. discovery violations] for abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002 
UT App 126, ^  16, 47 P.3d 115 (alterations in original) (citation omitted); see also State 
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). However, where defendant's discovery 
claims were not preserved below, they may only be reviewed for plain error. To establish 
plain error, defendant must show that (1) the trial court erred; (2) the error should have 
been obvious; and (3) the error was prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions and rules of criminal procedure 
are attached at Addendum A: 
United States Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 27, 2002, defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies (R. 2-3). Defendant's 
jury trial was held on February 11, 2003 (R. 134). After the State's case-in-chief, 
defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the State had failed to provide him with a 
police report in a related but separate case (R. 134:69-71). The trial court denied 
defendant's motion (R. 134:72). Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged (R. 
96-97, 109-110; R. 134:101). He was then sentenced to concurrent terms of zero-to-five 
years on his convictions (R. 109-110). Defendant timely appealed (R. 114). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime. On September 19, 2002, a concerned citizen called the Salt Lake City 
Police Department to complain about suspicious activity at a downtown apartment 
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complex (R. 134:20-21). Sergeant Michael Ross, Detective Nicholas Schneider, and one 
other officer responded (R. 134:21). 
After knocking at the door and briefly talking with the renter named Lucero, the 
three officers entered the apartment (R. 134:21-22). Sergeant Ross was the first to follow 
Lucero into the apartment (R. 134:21-22). Lucero stood to the right of the door in the 
living room (R. 134:23-24). Ross saw several other people also in the living room (R. 
134:22-23). Ross then saw defendant standing alone in the kitchen area, which was 
separated from the living room by a small island (R. 134:22-23). 
As Sergeant Ross entered the apartment, defendant put his hands into his pants 
pockets (R. 134:26). Concerned for his and his fellow officers' safety, Ross told 
defendant to keep his hands out where they could be seen (R. 134:26). Defendant pulled 
his hands out of his pockets and swung them down (R. 134:26). As he did so, Sergeant 
Ross "saw the two plastic twist[s] fall out of his hand" (R. 134:26, 30, 35, 46, 52). 
Defendant was immediately arrested (R. 134:57). The officers then field tested the two 
twists (R. 134:31; St. Exh. 5). One tested positive for cocaine; the other tested positive 
for heroin (R. 134:31; St. Exh. 5). 
Preliminary hearing testimony. At defendant's preliminary hearing, Detective 
Schneider testified that he and two other officers went to a Salt Lake apartment on 
September 19, 2002 in response to a citizen's complaint alleging possible drug activity 
(R. 137:4). When Sergeant Ross knocked on the door, a man named Lucero opened the 
door and explained that he was the renter (R. 137:4). After a brief conversation, Lucero 
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let the officers into his small apartment (R. 137:4-5). Once inside, Detective Schneider 
noticed numerous people sitting in the living room and defendant standing in the kitchen 
(R. 137:5). Sergeant Ross then asked defendant to take his hands out of his pocket (R. 
137:5). As defendant did, Sergeant Ross saw two twists fall onto the floor out of 
defendant's pocket (R. 137:5). One twist field-tested positive for heroine; the other field-
tested positive for cocaine (R. 137:7). 
On cross-examination, Detective Schneider testified that Sergeant Ross had filed a 
report in the case (R. 137:7). He also testified that the third officer present at the scene 
took the twists into evidence (R. 137:8). Defendant did not ask Schneider whether he or 
any other officer had identified or talked with the other people in the living room 
(R.137:7-9). He only asked the prosecutor for a copy of Ross's report (R. 137:7). The 
prosecutor indicated that he wasn't sure he had a copy of the report but that he would 
check (R. 137:7-8). The prosecutor provided defendant with a copy of Ross's report a 
week later (R. 24). 
The trial. Defendant fs opening statement. In his opening statement at trial, 
defense counsel noted that there were numerous other people in the apartment when 
defendant was arrested, including Lucero and a man named Pollock1 (R. 134:16). 
However, counsel continued, the State would produce no evidence from them concerning 
the twists or who owned them (R. 134:16). The reason, counsel argued, was because the 
officers never asked Lucero or Pollock about them (R. 134:16-17). Nor, according to 
!In the transcript, this man is initially identified as Pullet (R. 134:16). This person 
is identified later in the transcript as Pollock (R. 134:70). 
4 
defense counsel, could the officers tell the jurors the other persons' names because they 
never asked (R. 134:16-17). 
Defense counsel then told the jury to pay careful attention to Sergeant Ross's 
testimony because he was the only person to see defendant drop the twists (R. 134:19). 
Given all the people in the apartment and what they might be doing, counsel asked, "[d]id 
[Sergeant Ross] see this man drop this or does he think he saw him drop it?" (R. 134:19). 
Trial testimony. Sergeant Ross was the first person to testify at defendant's trial 
(R. 134:19). Ross explained his entry into Lucero's apartment, where the different people 
were situated in the apartment, and the circumstances under which he saw defendant drop 
the drugs (R. 134:21-26, 30, 32). Ross testified that before dropping the drugs, defendant 
had "a deer-in-a-headlight look, very surprised to see me walk in the door" (R. 134:51). 
Moreover, although there were several people in the apartment living room at the time, no 
one else was in the kitchen area when defendant dropped the twists (R. 134:40). 
Ross then testified that he noticed a lot of narcotic paraphernalia located around 
the house, including where the other people were in the living room (R. 134:32, 42). In 
fact, two of the people in the living room were subsequently charged with paraphernalia 
violations (R. 134:43). According to Ross, Detective Schneider would have gotten their 
names, as well as the names of the other people who were in the apartment living room at 
the time (R. 134:51). 
Detective Schneider testified that, although he did not see defendant drop the 
twists, he took custody of defendant at Ross's instruction (R. 134:55, 57). At the time, 
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defendant was the only person in the kitchen, everyone else was in the living ioom area 
several feet away (R. 134:54, 56). No one was in any other room in the apartment, 
including the bathroom (R. 134:39, 63). 
On cross-examination, Schneider reiterated that at least two other people in the 
apartment—Lucero and Pollock—were arrested dunng the incident on paraphernalia 
charges (R. 134:64). Their names, as well as the names of the other people in the living 
room, were recorded in a police report filed in connection with the paraphernalia cases 
(R. 134:65-66). 
On re-direct, Schneider explained that the paraphernalia cases were separated from 
defendant's because it is easier to file charges on each individual when there are separate 
incidents of drug possession or paraphernalia possession (R. 134:69). 
Defendant }s mistrial motion. After Schneider's testimony, the State rested (R. 
134:69). The trial court then excused the jury, and defendant moved "either for a mistnal 
or dismissal" because he had not received a copy of the report Schneider had filed in the 
paraphernalia cases and, although defendant was aware of Lucero and Pollock, "it sounds 
like there's some potential witnesses that could be out there, some names of people that I 
don't know who they are" (R. 134:69-70). 
The trial court noted that because defense counsel knew that others had been 
arrested at the scene and that at least five people were present at the time, she could have 
obtained the names of those people (R. 134:70). When defense counsel intimated that she 
had been misled dunng the preliminary heanng because Schneider had testified that he 
6 
had never obtained the other persons' names, the prosecutor correctly noted that no 
questions concerning those other persons' identities were asked during the preliminary 
hearing (R. 134:71). The prosecutor then argued that he was unaware of the 
paraphernalia report, which had not become part of his file because it was not part of this 
case(R. 134:72). 
The trial court ruled: 
Well, the testimony so far was that [defendant] was somewhat 
isolated because of the counter top and everyone was at least 
somewhere between two to five feet away. I don't see how it would 
be relevant to his defense [and] I don't think he's prejudiced by it. 
I'm going to deny the motion. 
(R. 134:72). 
Defendant's testimony. In his defense, defendant testified that he was at Lucero's 
apartment only to pick up a friend, Maria (R. 134:74, 78). When Maria indicated that she 
would not be ready for a few minutes, defendant sat down and drank a beer another 
person in the apartment had brought him (R. 134:74, 79). When defendant finished the 
beer, he was told he could go into the kitchen to get another (R. 134:74). Another person 
was initially in the kitchen with defendant, but that person then went into the bathroom 
(R. 134:79). 
While defendant was still in the kitchen, the officers arrived (R. 134:74). 
Defendant had one hand on his beer and the other in his pocket when they arrived (R. 
134:76). When the officers told him to remove his hand from his pocket, he put his beer 
on the counter and took his hand out (R. 134:76). He did not toss any twists at that time 
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(R. 134:77). In fact, he was not even aware of them until one of the officers said that he 
had found them on the floor and that they belonged to defendant (R. 134:77). 
Defendant testified that he had been in the apartment for only three to five minutes 
when the police arrived (R. 134:75). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the prosecution committed a discovery violation under both 
Brady v. Maryland and rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it did not 
disclose the existence of the police report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia 
cases. Defendant claims that this discovery violation prejudiced him because the report 
contained the names of the other people who were in Lucero's apartment when defendant 
was arrested, and those people might have had "potentially exculpatory evidence." Thus, 
defendant claims, the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for 
mistrial or dismissal based on the alleged violation. 
Before this Court will consider a claim on appeal, defendant must show that the 
claim was preserved below. Otherwise, the claim will be considered only if defendant 
establishes that plain error or exceptional circumstances justify its review. Here, 
defendant did not preserve his discovery claims below. Moreover, he does not argue 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Consequently, this Court should not 
consider defendant's claims. 
Even if this Court reaches defendant's claims, they may be reviewed only for plain 
error. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that 
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the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial 
to him. Here, defendant cannot establish plain error on either of his claims. 
To establish a Brady claim, defendant must show both that he could not have 
obtained the information through his own diligence and that the omitted information was 
material and exculpatory. Defendant cannot make either showing here. First, where 
defendant personally knew at least one of the people, Maria, who was in the apartment at 
the time he was arrested, and also knew the names both of the apartment renter and the 
other person who was arrested on paraphernalia charges that day, defendant cannot show 
that the information he claims should have been disclosed—i.e., the names of the other 
persons present in the apartment when he was arrested—was unavailable to him through 
other sources. Second, where defendant has not included either a copy of the police 
report or any information concerning what testimony, if any, the witnesses named therein 
had to offer concerning the drug twists, defendant cannot show that the undisclosed 
evidence was material and exculpatory. Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails. 
To establish a discovery violation under rule 16, defendant must show that he did 
not know of the existence of the item that the prosecutor failed to disclose, that the 
discovery request he submitted to the prosecutor encompassed the undisclosed item, and 
that the failure to disclose the item prejudiced him. Again, defendant cannot make those 
showings here. First, defendant has not shown why, when he knew at least three of the 
five other people in the apartment when he was arrested, he could not have obtained the 
names of the other two without the omitted police report. Second, defendant has not 
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shown why, based on the discovery request he made in this case, the prosecutor was 
required to provide him with either the names of those people or a copy of the police 
report that allegedly contained them. Finally, where defendant could have sought the 
witnesses' names on his own and where defendant has placed nothing in the record 
indicating those witnesses would have helped his case, defendant has not shown he was 
prejudiced by the alleged nondisclosure. Defendant's rule 16 claim, therefore, also fails. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED 
DISCOVERY CLAIMS WHERE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ARGUE 
PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL AND CANNOT SHOW ERROR IN 
ANY CASE 
Defendant claims that the prosecution committed a discovery violation under both 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, when it did not disclose the existence of the police report that Detective 
Schneider filed in the paraphernalia cases. Aplt. Br. at 9-19. Defendant claims this 
discovery violation prejudiced him because it withheld from him the names of the other 
people who were in the apartment when he was arrested and thus "6den[ied] him 
knowledge of potentially exculpatory witnesses in his case." Aplt. Br. at 15. Defendant 
concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for mistrial 
or dismissal based on this alleged discovery violation. See Aplt. Br. at 17-18. 
This Court should reject defendant's claims because they were not preserved 
below and defendant does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
Alternatively, defendant's claims fail on their merits. 
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A. Defendant's claims fail because he did not raise them below and 
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s] on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ | 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at tnal 
must '"be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error'" of which 
defendant now complains so that the court '"might have an opportunity to correct [it] if 
[the court] deems it proper.'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 
460 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, at H 11. Where defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' 
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] decline to consider it on 
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted); see 
also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this case, defendant moved for a mistrial or dismissal after the State's case-in-
chief based on surprise, not a discovery violation, arguing that "[apparently there's 
another [police] report out there . . . and it sounds like there's some potential witnesses 
that could be out there, some names of people that I don't know who they are" (R. 
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134:69-70; Addendum B). Defendant never mentioned the state or federal due process 
clauses or rule 16 in support of his motion, let alone argued that the prosecutor's failure to 
provide the report violated those provisions (R. 134:69-72; Addendum B). Consequently, 
defendant's claims were not preserved below. 
Thus, defendant's claims can only be reached on appeal if he demonstrates plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at ^ 11; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 
1229; Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570. Because he has alleged neither, his claims fail. 
Should this Court nevertheless decide to reach defendant's unperserved claims, it 
should only review them for plain error. To demonstrate plain error, defendant must 
show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial to him. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
09 (Utah 1993). 
B. Defendant's Brady claim fails because he cannot show that the 
names of those present in the apartment were unavailable to him 
through other sources or that those names were exculpatory. 
Defendant claims that the State violated his constitutional nghts to due process by 
failing to provide him with a copy of a police report filed in a different case which 
contained the names of persons who were in the same apartment as defendant when he 
was arrested. See Aplt. Br. at 9-15. 
Under both the state and federal due process clauses, the "prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence and evidence that is 'so 
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to 
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produce.'" State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980) (quoting United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). The prosecutor has this duty whether or not defendant 
actually requests such evidence. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J 32, 37 P.3d 1073. 
A defendant can show that the prosecutor violated this constitutional duty—i.e., 
committed a Brady violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)—only if 
he can establish that: 
the state suppressed] information that (1) remain[ed] unknown to 
the defense both before and throughout trial and (2) is material and 
exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 
"reasonable probability" that "the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." 
Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^  33 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 
However, "c[w]hen . . . a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the 
supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.'" Id., 
2001 UT 99, K 44 n.l (quoting United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
1. Defendant's claim fails where he had enough information 
to ascertain the alleged Brady material on his own. 
A defendant cannot establish a Brady violation "where the evidence at issue is 
known to the defense prior to or during trial, where the defendant reasonably should have 
known of the evidence, or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its 
advantage during trial but failed to do so." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 33. Thus, "'[w]hen . . . 
a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady material 
on his own, there is no suppression by the government.'" Id., 2001 UT 99, ^ | 44 n. 1 
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(quoting United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991)). u[E]vidence is not 
improperly withheld if the defense has knowledge of that evidence and defense counsel 
simply fails to request it." State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980). 
Here, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation when he 
did not disclose the police report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia cases 
because that report contained the names of the other people who were in the apartment 
when defendant was arrested and those people might have been able to help defendant's 
case. See Aplt. Br. at 9, 11. Because defendant had sufficient information to, with 
reasonable diligence, obtain that information on his own, he has not shown the first prong 
of a Brady violation. 
According to Sergeant Ross, there were only six people other than police officers 
in the apartment when defendant was arrested; two of those six people were defendant 
and Lucero, the leaseholder (R. 134:22, 25, 36, 39, 40). According to Detective 
Schneider, there were only five other people present, including Lucero and defendant (R. 
134:54, 63). Although defendant testified that yet another person was in the bathroom 
when the police arrived (R. 134:79), defendant's self-serving testimony was contradicted 
by both Sergeant Ross and Detective Schneider (R. 134:39-40, 63). Thus, at most, 
defendant was looking for the names of five people, other than himself, who were present 
in the apartment when he was arrested. 
However, prior to trial, defendant already knew the names of at least three of those 
people. Defendant's own trial testimony indicates that one of those people was his friend, 
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Maria (R. 134:74). Then, from his preliminary hearing, defendant learned that another 
person present—the one who rented the apartment—was named Lucero (R. 137:4; R. 
134:16, 70); see also Aplt. Br. at 7 ("Only the report filed in Mr. Crespo's case was 
provided to the defense counsel, and it contained the names of only two of the witnesses 
interviewed by police at the crime scene.") (citing R. 134 at 70 (defense counsel 
acknowledging prior knowledge of Lucero and Pollock)). Finally, as evidenced by his 
opening statement, defendant also knew by the time of trial that a third person present 
was named Pollock (134:17, 70); see Aplt. Br. at 1: 
Thus, by the time of his trial, defendant was at most still looking only for the 
names of two of the people who were present in the apartment when he was arrested. 
Since Maria was his friend (R. 134:74), defendant could have sought those names from 
her. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant asked Maria for those last two names 
or that Maria lacked that information. 
Alternatively, defendant could have tried to obtain the information from Lucero. 
From the preliminary hearing, defendant knew that Lucero was the person who was 
renting the apartment in which defendant was arrested (R. 137:4). Since Lucero was the 
apartment's renter, Lucero would presumably know the people he let into his apartment. 
Moreover, since defendant had gotten to the apartment on his own free will that day (R. 
2In fact, Detective Ross's police report, which was provided to defendant, see Aplt. 
Br. at 7, not only identified Lucero and Pollock as being in the apartment at the time, but 
also specifically identified them as the two people who were arrested on the paraphernalia 
charges and provided the case number assigned to those charges. See Police Report at 
Addendum C. 
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134:73-74), he apparently knew where he could locate Lucero. Yet, nothing in the record 
indicates that defendant asked Lucero for the names of the two unidentified people or that 
Lucero lacked that information. 
A third avenue open to defendant was to attempt to locate and talk with Pollock. 
Defendant could have sought Pollock's contact information from Maria or Lucero. 
Again, nothing in the record indicates that defendant pursued this avenue or that it would 
have been futile if pursued. 
Finally, since the record indicates that defendant apparently knew about the 
paraphernalia cases prior to his trial and that Lucero and Pollock were the persons 
arrested in those cases (R. 134:16-17, 43, 64-65, 70); see also Aplt. Br. at 7 (referring to 
police report in which paraphernalia arrests were listed), defendant could have sought any 
police reports generated in those cases to determine whether those reports contained the 
names of those two other people. Defendant did not take this route either (R. 134:69-72). 
Based on this record, defendant had "enough information to be able to ascertain 
the supposed Brady material on his own." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 44. Therefore, 
defendant cannot now base a Brady claim on his failure to obtain it. See Jarrell, 608 P.2d 
at 225; see also Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ffl[ 33, 44. 
Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails. 
2. Defendant's claim fails because he cannot show that the 
evidence was material and exculpatory. 
"Contrary to appellant's claims, the State is not constitutionally compelled to 
disclose any and all information which may assist [a] defendant in preparing for trial." 
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State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, as explained above, to establish a Brady violation, defendant must 
show that the undisclosed evidence was both constitutionally "material" and "exculpatory 
. . . to the defense." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, t 32; see also Workman, 635 P.2d at 52 ("[F]or 
undisclosed evidence to be considered as coming within the purview of [Brady], it must 
be exculpatory in nature."). 
"Evidence is constitutionally material 'if there is a reasonable probability' that the 
'result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense.'" State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, t 31, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682). It is exculpatory only if it is "favorable" to the defendant. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 
U 32; see also State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 34, 52 P.3d 451 (holding that where 
evidence is inculpatory rather than exculpatory, no Brady claim exists). 
Finally, "the 'mere possibility' that undisclosed evidence might favor a defendant 
cannot establish a Brady violation." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^  49 (quoting State v. Shaffer, 
725 P.2d 1301, 1305-06 (Utah 1986)); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-
10 (1976) ("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have 
helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 
'materiality' in the constitutional sense."); id., All U.S. at 112 n.20 (rejecting argument 
that "standard" for materiality "should focus on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on 
the defendant's ability to prepare for trial" because inculpatory as well as exculpatory 
evidence may affect preparation); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Utah 1983). 
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If the "evidence is so speculative that it is impossible to see how it could have affected 
the outcome of the trial," the Brady claim must fail. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 
(Utah 1984). 
Here, defendant claims that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to 
provide him with a copy of the report Detective Schneider filed in the paraphernalia 
cases. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14. No copy of Detective Schneider's report appears in the 
record. See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) ("Parties claiming error below 
and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations 
with an adequate record."); see also State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 13, 69 P.3d 1278 
("When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed 
to support the action of the trial court." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998). 
Thus, the only non-speculative fact we know about the report is that it contains the 
names of other individuals who were in the apartment when defendant was arrested (R. 
134:66, 69-70). As stated, three of those names were already known to defendant. See 
pp. 14-15 supra. Because defendant did not call any of those three people as witnesses at 
his trial, the presumption is those witnesses did not have material, exculpatory evidence. 
In any case, because defendant knew the names of these people, the nondisclosure of their 
names cannot support defendant's Brady claim. 
Only two of the people named in the report, therefore, could support defendant's 
claim. Because those people—like Maria, Lucero and Pollock—may know nothing about 
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defendant's cnme or may only have information that inculpates defendant, their names 
alone are not material and exculpatory in the constitutional sense. Defendant simply 
cannot show that '"there is a reasonable probability' that the 'result of [defendant's trial] 
would have been different'" had defendant known those names. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 
[^ 31 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Indeed, we do not even know whether defendant 
would have called these two witnesses if he had known their names. Thus, whether those 
witnesses would have provided exculpatory evidence "is so speculative that it is 
impossible to see how it could have affected the outcome of the trial." Shabata, 678 P.2d 
at 788; see also Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ^ 34. 
Defendant attempts to overcome this record deficiency by claiming that "when the 
prosecutor withholds the names of witnesses, it is not necessary for the defense to prove 
that their testimonies are exculpatory" but only that "they are potentially exculpatory." 
Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 33). Defendant reasons that unknown 
testimony automatically qualifies as Brady material because it is "potentially 
exculpatory." See Aplt. Br. at 11 ("So, the fact that the defense counsel in this case was 
unable to provide the trial court with summaries of the witnesses' testimonies does not 
justify the prosecutor's failure to provide the names and other known information about 
them."). 
No authority supports defendant's argument. Indeed, his claim is directly contrary 
to the case law cited above. See Agurs, All U.S. 109-110; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^  49, 
Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305-06, Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1106. 
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Bisner, the sole case upon which he relies, see Aplt. Br. at 11, also does not 
support this argument. The term "potentially exculpatory" appears only once in Bisner, 
and then only as a direct quote from a 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case. See Bisner, 2001 
UT 99, U 33 (quoting United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(additional citations omitted)). It appears almost immediately after the court confirms 
that Brady applies "both to substantively exculpatory evidence and to that which may be 
used for impeachment." Id., 2001 UT 99, ^  32. And it appears almost immediately 
before the court confirms that "a Brady violation occurs only where the state suppresses 
information that . . . is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have 
created a 'reasonable probability' that 'the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.'" Id., 2001 UT 99, \ 33 (emphasis added). 
In this context, there are only two possible interpretations of "potentially 
exculpatory." The first merely recognizes that all exculpatory evidence is only 
potentially exculpatory until the jury accepts it as fact. The second, possible where 
Bisner involved impeachment rather than direct exculpatory evidence, merely recognizes 
that Brady reaches not only evidence with an obvious exculpatory value, but also 
impeachment evidence, which, because it is not directly favorable to a defendant, is not 
strictly-speaking exculpatory, but only potentially so. 
In short, nothing in either Bisner or the case from which the "potentially 
exculpatory" language is quoted supports defendant's contention that Brady applies to all 
undisclosed information so long as its unknown nature holds out the possibility that it 
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might be exculpatory. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 31-40; see also Mullins, 22 F.3d at 
1370-73; Thigpen v. State, 825 So.2d 241, 245 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (rejecting Brady 
claim where defendant "did not identify any exculpatory evidence that Timothy 
Worsham, the witness whose name allegedly was not disclosed, could have provided") 
(footnote omitted), cert, denied (Ala. Jan. 25, 2002). To the contrary, as explained above, 
the clear import of Brady and its progeny, including Bisner, is that the "mere possibility" 
that undisclosed evidence might be exculpatory can never establish a Brady violation. 
See Agurs, 427 U.S. 109-110; Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ffi[ 31-40; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \ 49, 
Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305-06, Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1106. 
Significantly, defendant was not without a means by which to place that evidence 
on the record. For instance, instead of requesting the drastic remedies of mistrial or 
dismissal, defendant could have sought a continuance to obtain a copy of the report, 
investigate any potential witnesses identified therein, and then call them at trial or at least 
proffer their testimony in support of his discovery claim. See, e.g.,, State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (suggesting there is hierarchy of 
remedies for discovery violations; holding that trial court does not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting dismissal remedy when defendant has failed to seek "other, less harsh 
remedies"). Alternatively, defendant could have sought the undisclosed information after 
trial and then filed a motion for new trial and requested an evidentiary hearing thereon. 
Finally, defendant could on appeal have alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 
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and requested a remand under rule 23B to develop a factual record in support of his 
claim ^ 
Because defendant pursued none of these options, this Court is left with mere 
speculation as to whether the two missing witnesses may have helped defendant's case 
As already stated, "the 'mere possibility' that undisclosed evidence might favor a 
defendant cannot establish a Brady violation." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 49 (citation 
omitted). 
Consequently, defendant's Brady claim fails. 
C. Defendant's rule 16 claim fails because defendant should have 
been aware of the police report and the names it contained 
before trial; because such information was not encompassed 
within his discovery request; and because, in any case, he has not 
made the necessary showing of prejudice to support his claim. 
Defendant alternatively claims that the State's failure to provide him with a copy 
of Detective Schneider's report m the paraphernalia cases "violated the Discovery Rule, 
3Perhaps because of the need to have the disputed evidence in the record, all the 
discovery cases m Utah found by the State address situations in which the specific nature 
of the disputed evidence was either placed on the record at tnal or was placed on the 
record through another method, usually a post-trial motion. See, e g , State v Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98,1f 21, 989 P.2d 1065 (evidence presented at tnal); State v Whittle, 1999 UT 
96, H 23, 989 P.2d 52 (evidence disclosed at tnal); State v Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 400 
(Utah 1994) (evidence presented dunng tnal); State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 
1987) (evidence presented dunng tnal); State v Fierst, 692 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1984) 
(unclear how evidence became part of record but substance of disputed evidence clearly 
established), State v Perez, 2002 UT App 211, U 37, 52 P.3d 451 (evidence presented at 
tnal), State v Martinez, 2002 UT App 126,ffij 12-13, 47 P.3d 115 (eudence presented at 
trial), State v Rugebregt, 965 P 2d 518, 522 (Utah App 1998) (evidence presented at 
trial), State v Christofferson, 793 P 2d 944, 946 (Utah App. 1990) (evidence presented 
dunng trial), State v Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah App. 1989) (evidence presented 
dunng tnal) 
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Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Aplt. Br. at 15. Specifically, 
defendant claims that, because he "made a formal discovery request pursuant to Rule 16" 
and "asked for c[a]ny evidence which tends to negate . . . or mitigate' his guilt, a list of all 
witnesses the State intended to call for trial, along with their personal contact information, 
and any reports involved in the prosecution or investigation of this case," the police report 
"containing the names of witnesses should have been provided to him." Aplt. Br. at 15. 
Defendant's alternative claim also lacks merits. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to 
the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
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Utah R. Cnm. P. 16 (emphasis added). 
Thus, while Brady or due process requires a prosecutor to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence whether or not the defense requests it, see State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, H 32, 37 P.3d 1073, rule 16 requires a prosecutor to make disclosures only upon 
request, see Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a). 
To make out a discovery claim under rule 16, defendant must first show that "the 
scope of his request encompassed the omitted items and that the State undertook an 
unqualified obligation to provide them." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^  20, 989 P.2d 
1065. He must then "make a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired 
the defense." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). 
However, as with a Brady claim, a "'prosecutor cannot be cited for a discovery 
violation [under rule 16] where the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item 
that the State failed to disclose.'" State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 25, 989 P.2d 52 (quoting 
approvingly State v. White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). 
1. Defendant's claim fails because he knew or should have 
known about the police report before trial and could have 
sought it on his own. 
"The prosecution has a duty to make a correct and complete disclosure, but 
defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation." State v. 
Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). Thus, a "'prosecutor cannot be cited for a 
discovery violation where the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item that 
the State failed to disclose.'" Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^  25 (citation omitted). 
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As previously discussed, defendant had sufficient information before trial to seek 
the information he now claims should have been provided See pp 15-16 supra 
Consequently, defendant's rule 16 discovery claim fails. 
2. Defendant's claim fails because his discovery request did 
not encompass a police report filed in a different case. 
As previously discussed, rule 16 requires a prosecutor to make disclosures only 
upon request See Utah R Com P 16(a). '"Where. . matenal [requested in discovery] 
is not covered by the detailed descriptions m subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4), which 
mandate disclosure upon request, subsection (a)(5), the catch-all provision, applies It 
requires disclosure of the matenal sought only to the extent ordered by the tnal court'" 
State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ^  18, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting State v Knight, 734 P.2d 
913,916 (Utah 1987)). "However, where no court order has been imposed and the 
prosecutor undertakes to voluntanly respond to a discovery request, the prosecutor 'must 
produce all of the matenal requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the 
request with respect to which no responsive matenal will be provided '" Id (quoting 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 916-17). 
To make out a rule 16 violation "[u]nder the pnnciples outlined in Knight, 
[defendant] must demonstrate that the scope of his request encompassed the omitted items 
and that the State undertook an unqualified obligation to provide them." Hopkins, 1999 
UT 98, H 20. 
In this case, the record does not clearly indicate whether the State voluntanly 
responded to defendant's discovery request or whether the State qualified its response in 
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any way. Thus, the State does not concede on this record that it "undertook an 
unqualified obligation to provide [defendant with his requested information]." Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98,^)20. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor did undertake such a duty, however, 
defendant must still show "that the scope of his request encompassed the omitted items." 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 20. Defendant has not made that showing here. 
Defendant cites the following parts of his discovery request, see Aplt. Br. at 15, as 
supporting his discovery claim: 
1. Any evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or 
mitigate the degree of the offense that has been 
discovered by any member of the agencies involved in 
the investigation or prosecution of the above-entitled 
case. 
2. A list of all the witnesses that the State intends to call for trial 
in the above-entitled matter, their addresses, telephone 
numbers and the adult and juvenile criminal records. 
3. Any recordings, reports, transcripts or reports [sic] about 
statements in possession of any member or group involved in 
the prosecution of the investigation of the above-entitled case 
taken from any of the witnesses listed in number 2. 
8. Any police or investigative reports excluding the Salt Lake 
District Attorney's work product, made during the course of 
the investigation or prosecution of this case. 
(R. 16-18). None of these requests "encompass[] the omitted item[]." Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, T] 20. First, as previously discussed, no copy of the omitted police report appears in 
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the record, and all that is known about it is that it contains the names of other people who 
were in the apartment when defendant was arrested. See p. 18 supra. Thus, defendant 
cannot show that the omitted report should have been provided because it "tend[ed] to 
negate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the 
degree of the offense that has been discovered by any member of the agencies involved in 
the investigation or prosecution of the above-entitled case" (R. 16). See pp. 16-21 supra. 
Second, nothing in the record indicates that the State intended to call any of the 
people listed in that report as witnesses at defendant's trial. Thus, defendant cannot show 
that the State failed to provide defendant with "[a] list of all the witnesses that the State 
intend[ed] to call for trial" or "[a]ny recordings, reports, [or] transcripts . . . about 
statements . . . taken from any of the witnesses listed in number 2"(R. 16). 
Finally, everything in the record indicates that the officers involved in this case 
believed that their investigation of the crime involving defendant was essentially 
complete upon defendant's arrest and was separate from the crimes involving the people 
in the living room (R. 134:25, 40 (Sergeant Ross testifying that defendant was only 
person in kitchen); R. 134:46 (Ross testifying that he did not include defendant's 
exculpatory statement in police report because "I watched it. I saw it happen. There was 
no doubt in my mind whatsoever what he did."); R. 134:46-47 (Ross testifying that report 
in defendant's case was only report he wrote); R. 134:50 (Ross testifying that he did not 
see need to have defendant tested for drugs where "It had nothing to do with this case in 
my opinion. I saw him throw dope on the ground."); R. 134:52 (Ross explaining that no 
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one else was charged with possession because defendant "was the individual ] observed 
throw the narcotics to the ground."); R. 134:43-45, 52 (Ross explaining that he did not 
read defendant his rights because he did not intend to interview defendant); R. 134:55, 
61-62 (Detective Schneider indicating he was told by Ross to hold onto defendant and 
that Ross explained by "pointing] out" the plastic twists on the ground); R. 134:56 
(Schneider explaining relative positions of people in apartment); R. 134:57 (Schneider 
explaining that he "just took custody of the defendant and just pretty much held him and 
the evidence there"); R. 134:57 (Schneider testifying that a different detective took the 
information concerning the other people in the apartment); R. 134:58-59 (Schneider 
identifying paraphernalia found in living room and on kitchen counter and testifying that 
defendant was not charged with possession of those items); R. 134:63 (Schneider 
testifying that defendant was only person in kitchen area); R. 134:65-66 (Schneider 
testifying that he got the names of the individuals present in the living room but that he 
included them in report for paraphernalia cases); R. 134:68 (Schneider distinguishing 
between evidence in defendant's case and evidence in paraphernalia cases filed under 
different case number); R. 134:69 (Schneider explaining: "It's easier to file charges with 
the courts when there are separate incidents in regard to the possession or the 
paraphernalia when it's different individuals. Each individual for the most part gets their 
own case.")). 
Where defendant was seen in possession of cocaine and heroine in the kitchen of 
an apartment and two separate individuals were found in possession of drug paraphernalia 
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in a different room, defendant cannot show that the officers were incorrect in treating the 
crimes as distinct and separate. Thus, defendant cannot show that a police report filed in 
the paraphernalia cases should have been provided because it was a "police or 
investigative report[] . . . made during the course of the investigation or prosecution of 
this case" (R. 17) (emphasis added). 
Because defendant has not "demonstrate^] that the scope of his request 
encompassed the omitted item," his discovery claim fails. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, \ 20. 
3. Defendant's claim fails because he has not made a credible 
showing that his defense was impaired. 
Even if defendant's claim were otherwise viable, it would still fail because he has 
not "ma[d]e a credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense." 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). 
In Knight, the supreme court outlined what a defendant must show to establish 
reversible error based on a discovery violation. Where, as here, a defendant claims that a 
discovery violation impeded his ability to present a defense, defendant must not only 
show that the State failed to provide him with requested information but he must also 
"present[] a credible argument that his defense was impaired." Id. Only then does the 
burden shift to the State "to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more favorable for the defendant." 
Id' 
'Knight addresses prejudice from a discovery violation in the context of 
undisclosed inculpatory evidence that was used against the defendant at trial. See Knight, 
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In this case, defendant cannot show that his defense was impaired. As previously 
discussed, defendant had all the information necessary to identify and conduct his own 
investigation of the other people in the apartment when he was arrested. See pp. 15-16 
supra. Absent some indication that nondisclosure of the police report obstructed that 
investigation, defendant cannot show that nondisclosure impeded his defense. See 
Knight, 734P.2dat921. 
As also previously discussed, the record does not contain either the undisclosed 
report nor any indication of the testimony the witnesses named therein would have given. 
See pp. 18-22 supra. Absent some record establishing that the undisclosed police report 
would have led to relevant evidence helpful to his case, defendant cannot make any 
"credible argument that the prosecutor's errors . . . impaired the defense." Knight, 734 
P.2dat921. 
Consequently, defendant's rule 16 claim fails. 
734 P.2d at 921; see also State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Utah App. 1998) 
(applying Knight where State failed to provide statutory notice of expert witness allowed 
to testify at trial). Thus, it is unclear whether Knighfs burden-shifting prejudice analysis 
applies where the evidence was not used against the defendant at trial and there is no 
indication that the evidence was exculpatory, inculpatory, or indifferent. However, 
because defendant has not even met the lesser preliminary burden under Knight, this 
Court need not decide whether defendant had to also meet the greater prejudice burden 
traditionally placed on defendants who allege harmful error. Cf. State v. Belh 770 P.2d 
100, 106 (Utah 1988) ("Ordinarily, . . . the accused [has] the burden of persuading this 
Court that. . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial result would have been more 
favorable absent the error."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
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United States Const. Amend. XVI, § 1 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(a)(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(a)(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(a)(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(a)(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(a)(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the farther 
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to 
prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses 
from harassment, abuse or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on 
the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psycho-
logical or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a contin-
uance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(h)(1) appear in a lineup; 
(h)(2) speak for identification; 
(h)(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(h)(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(h)(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(h)(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(h)(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(h)(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(h)(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time 
of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
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separate case from the others? 
A It's easier to file charges with the courts when 
there are separate incidents in regard to the possession or t 
paraphernalia when it's different individuals. Each individu 
for the most part gets their own case. 
MR. PLATT: Thank you. Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MS. SISNEROS: No, that's all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you Mr. 
Schneider. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. PLATT: And that is the State's final witness. 
THE COURT: State rests? 
MR. PLATT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Want to call you witness? 
MS. SISNEROS: Could I make a motion first, Your 
Honor? 
recess. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). We'll take a bri 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom). 
THE COURT: Okay, Ms. Sisneros. 
MS. SISNEROS: Given this last testimony by the 
officer, I would make a motion either for a mistrial or 
dismissal. Apparently there's another report out there and 
(inaudible) at the last preliminary hearing because there was 
1 also a report that hadn't been given to me and I made note of 
2 that and I told Mr. Piatt that there was a report that I did 
3 not have. That was Sargent Ross's report. I did receive that. 
4 I do have that but apparently there's another report and it 
5 sounds like there's some potential witnesses that could be out 
6 there, some names of people that I don't know who they are. I 
7 was never told who they were. I was never given that 
8 information. Those are potential witnesses for my client and I 
9 was not given the names of those individuals. I was given the 
10 names of Mr. Lucero and Mr. Pollock and that is it. And we had 
11 spenfic testimony about the report at the preliminary hearing 
12 that apparently the officer doesn't remember being at but - and 
13 I was told, and I told him, there's another report out there 
14 could I please have that. 
15 THE COURT: Well, now wait a minute. Did you ask for 
16 a report specific to this case or specific to another case? 
17 Because the testimony was, they filed some paraphernalia 
18 charges and reports went with those charges, not with Mr. 
19 Crespo and you knew that there were at least five people in the 
20 room as reported, right? So you could have found out those 
21 other names, couldn't you? 
22 MS. SISNEROS: Well, the testimony from the 
23 preliminary hearing was that these were the only names that 
24 they got. These were the only names that were listed along in 
25 any report, in the list of any of the other people. There are 
70 
1 no other witnesses listed. Normally they'll have a list of the 
2 other names of the people. My understanding, and understanding 
3 from the evidence at the preliminary hearing was that they 
4 never asked them their names, they never questioned them. 
5 THE COURT: Do you have proof of that? 
6 MS. SISNEROS: Well, I've got the transcript. I 
7 assume you've got the same police reports that I do and 
8 they're-
9 THE COURT: But if you asked the question at the 
10 preliminary hearing and they responded there were no other 
11 names, that's a little bit different. But if you didn't ask 
12 the question then it didn't become an issue. 
13 I'm assuming, Mr. Piatt, that they got all the 
14 reports that are relevant to this case? 
15 MR. PLATT: Yes, all of the reports that pertain to 
16 the possession case. The only point that I would make is 
17 certainly preliminary hearings are a discovery process for 
18 defense counsel. I'm looking through the preliminary hearing 
19 transcript. I don't note anywhere that there was a great 
20 number of people there or those kinds of questioning or these 
21 questions about paraphernalia charges and I think it's 
22 perfectly reasonable - and this happens in most cases. You 
23 have charges that are going to these defendants and then you 
24 have charges going to this defendant for completely separate 
25 behaviors and officers proceed and they track those separately 
71 
1 and they don't become part of this file because they are not 
2 part of this case and had they been discovered during the 
3 preliminary hearing, certainly counsel may have made a request 
4 for that separate case number but it would require that or have 
5 knowledge of it, at least (inaudible) prosecution. But in 
6 terms of relevance, well, it certainly would be relevant if 
7 we'd known about it. We just don't and we have completely 
8 separate case numbers here. So I don't see that there's any 
9 prejudicial effect when a preliminary hearing was held where at 
10 discovery could have - this kind of discovery could have been 
11 revealed through the process of (inaudible) and certainly the 
12 State would be held to limited questioning for purpose of a 
13 bind over (inaudible) submits to additional questions 
14 (inaudible) discovery. (inaudible). 
15 THE COURT: Well, the testimony so far was that Mr. 
16 Crespo was somewhat isolated because of the counter top and 
17 everyone was at least somewhere between two to five feet away. 
18 I don't see how it would be relevant to his defense. I don't 
19 think he's prejudiced by it. I'm going to deny the motion. 
20 Are you ready to go? 
21 MS. SISNEROS: Yes Your Honor. 
22 (Whereupon the jury returns to the courtroom) 
23 THE COURT: Do you want to call your witness? 
24 MS. SISNEROS: Defense calls Mr. Santiago Crespo. 
25 Your Honor, can we just for the record make it clear that Mr. 
72 
ADDENDUM C 
e: 1 SALT LAKH POLICE DEPARTMENT 
. DAI043 GENERAL OFFENSE KARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
, Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
neral Offense Information 
Operational status : OPEN/ACTIVE 
Reported on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2331 
Occurred on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2240 
Report submitted by K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad 
Located at 16 - 155 S 400 E 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County : Cncl Dist 4 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
fenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense : #1 3 532-0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED 
Location : Apartment 
Suspect used : Not Applicable 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing 
Offense : #2 3 512-0 DRUG-HEROIN POSSESS - COMPLETED 
Location : Apartment 
Suspect used : Not Applicable 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing 
aeral Offense Information (cont'd) 
Bias : None (no bias) 
Family violence : NO 
IBR Clearance status : Not Applicable 




I Drug Information 
Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized 
Drug type : Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack 
Estimated quantity : 0.200 
Drug measure : Gram 
Recovered/Stoien/etc. : Seized 
Drug type : Heroin 
Estimated quantity : 0.100 
Drug measure : Gram 
.mued . . . 
Date Value 
Value Recovered Recovered 
Page: 2 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For.- DA1C43 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 






Address : 16 - 155 S 400 E 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
General Information 
Case type : DRUG - COCAINE POSSESS Priority : 9 
Clrd : 23:31:18 
How call received : TELEPHONE 
Clearance Information 
Report expected : NO Founded : YES 
Cleared by : NOT FOR OFFICER USE(CITY ONLY) 
Reporting Officerl : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Related Person(s) 
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01 CRESPO, SANTIAGO 
Caucasian/White MALE 
Born on Jun-01-1959 
Residing at PO BOX 550 , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84634-
Reference Master Name Index 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
Caucasian/White MALE Born on Jun-01-195 9 
Aliases : DIETZ, SANTINO 
DIAZ, SANTIAGO CRESPO 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D 
CERSPO, SANTIGO DIAZ 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D 
SANTIAGO, DIAZ J. 
DIETZ, SANTINO J. 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
DIAZ, SANTIAGO 
DIAZ, SANTIAGO JR 
Zontmued . . . 
'6: 3 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
: DA1343 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
: SANTIAGO, DIAZ JR 
: CERSPO, SANTIG 
: CRESPO, SANTIGO 
: CRESPO, SANTIAG 
: CRESPO, SANTIGO DIAZ 
: DIZA, SANTIAGO 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Offense : 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED 
Arrest date : Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 




Offense : POSS CNTRLD SUBST/COCAINE 
Offense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
Charge class : FE Statute : 58.37.8.IB.I.32 




Offense : Poss Cntld Subst/Heroin 
Offense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
Charge class : FE Statute : 58.37.8.1b.i.12 
SHO points : 1 
General Offense : SL 2002-173133 
.inued 
Page 4 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For DA1C43 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Fn, Sep 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Related text paae(s) 
Document PROB CAUSE 
Author K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Subject SANTIAGO CRESPO 
Related date/time- Sep-19-02 2301 
A/P HAD IN HIS POSESSION ONE SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BLACK TAR 
SUBSTANCE COMMONLY KNOW AS (BLACK TAR HEROIN) . A/P ALSO HAD IN HIS 
POSESSION A SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A WHITE POWERDY SUBSTANCE 
COMMONLY KNOWN AS (COCAINE) A/P WAS OBSERVED BY UNDERCOVER NARCOTICS 
OFFICERS IN POSESSION OF THESE SUBSTANCES DURING AN UNDERCOVER OPERATICN 
Document INITIAL R/O FIELD 
Author K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Subject: Knock and talk 
Related date/time. Sep-19-02 2350 
Case #02-173120 and 02-173133 are related to each other. Two a/p's, Pollock 
and Lucero, were issued misdemeanor citation under this case 
number02-173120. A/p Crespo was taken to ]ail under case 02-173133, for 
possession. 
Sgt Ross received information from a concerned citizen in regards to 
an apartment in her complex, ML55 S 400 E #16,) that might be possibly selling 
or using drugs. Det Boe-ter lind I responded, along with Sgt Ross, to this 
location upon where we did a knock and talk. 
Sgt Ross knocked on the apt and Adolph Lucero (the owner of the apt) 
opened the door. Sgt Ross asked if the apt was his and he stated that it 
was He was then asked if we could come in and he stated yes. 
As soon as we walked inside Sgt Ross observed a/p Crespo attempt to 
put his hands down hisjpants. He was asked to keep his hands where we could 
see them, ^ and oncelie""Femoved his hands from__hi_s__£ants Sgt Ross observed a/p 
Crespo_drgp two small baggies "which"were"""later discovered to be black tar 
heroin and powder cocaine. Also in plain_ sight_was^numerous drug 
paraphernalia See Sgt Ross's supp. 
As I was watching a/p Crespo I observed a/p Pollock pass one of the 
ether individuals in the apartment something, which appeared to be a pack of 
matches Once the item/s was in her hand I saw something fall onto the 
ground and then the female attempted to kick it under the bed. As I looked 
closer the item/s passed was a small crack pipe (brown in color and aprx 3 
inches long) and a book of matches. I observed the whole transaction and I 
observed no items in the females hand as a/p Pollock gave her the item/s. 
All the paraphernalia was booked into evidence under case number 
02-173120 by Det Boelter Det Boelter booked the cocaine and heroin under 
case 02-173133. A/p Crespo was booked into ]ail for possession of heroin 
and cocaine under case 02-173133. NFD 
Document ASSTG FIELD SUPP 
Continued 
s 5 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
DAI043 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
, Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Author. K03 - Emery, John 
Surnect: A/P TRANSPORT 
Lated date/time: Sep-20-02 0451 
L was requested to assist city narcotics officers with the transport of 
:s a/p Santiago Crespo to jail. This a/p was transported and booked on 
i related charges with out incident. 
mued 
Page: 6 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For: DAI043 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Fri, Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Follow Up Report(s) 
Follow Up # 1 
Assignment Information 
Assigned to J14 - DeSpain, Amy Rank : Detective 
Crg unit : SLC Narcotics Squad 
Capacity : Investigate/Case Manager 
Assigned on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 0823 by J14 - DeSpain, Any 
Report due on Nov-19-2002 (Tue.) 
Submission Information 
Follow Up completed : NO 
Continued 
/ SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
DA1043 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
, Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
ated Property Report 
sport Information 
Report Number : 02173133 
Property case status : SEIZED 
Submitted on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) by Boelter, Tyler 
Authority for disposal : Gibson, Stanley D Org unit : Evidence 
Offense : GO SL 2002-173133 
Location : 155 S 400 E Apartment : 16 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County : Cncl Dist 4 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
Insurance letter received : NO 
General remarks : KNOCK AND TALK 
Related items : 2 
fs - Evidence 
i # TBI 
:us: SEIZED 
#: 02173133-1 Name: Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack 
"i: Powder Quantity: 0.20 
.: GM Value: 
:ription: WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P COCAINE 
)vered Date: Recovered Value: 
]S : X *e 
js - Evidence 
i # TB2 
us: SEIZED 
#: 02173133-2 Name: Heroin 
i: Powder Quantity: 0.10 
GM Value: 
'ription: BROWN POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P. HEROIN 
)vered Date: Recovered Value: 
ps x *e 
st Information 
Status . CHARGED 
Type of arrest : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only 
Reason for arrest : Other 
Arrest date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
mued . . . 
Page: 8 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For: DA1043 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Fri, Sep. 20 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Arresting officers : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas Arrest agency : S.L.C.PD 
Summary of facts : CG-POSS COCAINE, POSS HEROIN 
Arrest Location 
Civic address : 155 S 400 E 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County : Cncl Dist 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
Arrest Identification 
File number : 13666037 Arrest number : 11563 
Arrestee Information 
Case screened : NO Notify Victim on release: NO Juvenile : NO 
Diversion recommended : NO 
Interpreter needed : NO 
Rights given : NO 
Mental exam required : NO 
Statement taken : NO 
Fingerprinted : YES Photo taken : YES CD updated : YES 
Family notified : NO 
Lawyer called : NO Meal given : NO Coffee given : NO Arrestee's occupatic 
Detained : NO 
Related General Offense 
GOSL 2002-173133 
Related People 
Arrestee CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
Born on Jun-01-1959 
** END OF HARDCOPY REPORT ** 
DAVID E. VOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHAD L. PLATT. Bar No. S475 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE 
Case No. 021911370 FS 
Hon. William W. Barrett 
Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its attorneys, David E. Yocom, District 
Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Chad L. Piatt, Deputy District Attorney, hereby 
provides notice that the following additional discovery was provided on this 16th day of 
December, 2002; 
1. Salt Lake Pol ice Department Report 2002-173133, with supplemental 
narrative by Sgt. Mike Ross (counsel for both parties having become aware o( said 
narrative during preliminary hearing). 
DATED this :- day of December, 2002. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney 
By: ,- •. *
 x ^ 
CHAD'L. PLATT \ 
-—-—"'"Deputy District Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that tiue and cotTect copies of the foregoing \otice of 
Supplemental Discovery Response, was placed in the office's outgoing mailbox for 
delivery to Visa Sisneros, attorney for Santiago Crespo, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day of December, 2002. 
X 
L 
e 1 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
SN9652 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
, Dec. 10 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
neral Offense Information 
Operational status : CLOSED/ARREST 
Reported on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2331 
Occurred on Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2240 
Approved on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) by J14 - DeSpain, Amy 
Report submitted by K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad 
Located at 16 - 155 S 400 E 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
Cncl Dist 4 
fenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense : #1 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Location : Apartment 
Suspect used • Not Applicable 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing 
COMPLETED 
Offense : #2 3512 - 0 DRUG-HEROIN POSSESS 
Location : Apartment 
Suspect used : Not Applicable 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing 
- COMPLETED 
neral Offense Information (cont'd) 
Bias : None (no bias) 
Family violence : NO 
IBR Clearance status : Not Applicable 












R. Drug Information 
Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized 
Drug type : Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack 
Estimated quantity : 0.200 
Drug measure : Gram 
:mued 
age. 2 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
or: SN965 2 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SI, 2 002-173133 
ue, Dec. 10 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Recovered/Stolen/etc. : Seized 
Drug type : Heroin 
Estimated quantity : 0.100 






Address : 16 - 155 S 400 E 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
General Information 
Case type : DRUG - COCAINE POSSESS Priority : 9 
Clrd : 23:31:18 
How call received : TELEPHONE 
Clearance Information 
Report expected : NO Founded : YES 
Cleared by : NOT FOR OFFICER USE(CITY ONLY) 
Reporting Officerl : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Related Person(s) 
Case Specific : Arrestee - 01 CRESPO, SANTIAGO 
Caucasian/White MALE 
Born on Jun-01-1959 
Residing at PO BOX 550 , SALT LAKE CITY , Utah 84634-
Reference Master Name Index 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
Caucasian/White MALE Born on Jun-01-1959 
Aliases DIETZ, SANTINO 
DIAZ, SANTIAGO CRESPO 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D 
CERSPO, SANTIGO DIAZ 
CRESPO, SANTIAGO D 
SANTIAGO, DIAZ J. 
Continued 
3 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
SN9 65 2 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Dec. 10 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
: DIETZ, SANTINO J. 
: CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
: DIAZ, SANTIAGO 
: DIAZ, SANTIAGO JR 
: SANTIAGO, DIAZ JR 
: CERSPO, SANTIG 
: CRESPO, SANTIGO 
: CRESPO, SANTIAG 
: CRESPO, SANTIGO DIAZ 
: DIZA, SANTIAGO 
mkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Dffense : 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS - COMPLETED 
Arrest date : Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 
Arrest type : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only 
?e Summary 
arge # 4 8 
arge Information 
Dffense : POSS CNTRLD SUBST/COCAINE 
Dffense date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
Charge class : FE Statute : 58.37.8.IB.I.32 
General Offense : SL 2002-173133 
?e Summary 
arge # 4 9 
arge Information 
Dffense : Poss Cntld Subst/Heroin 
Dffense date .- Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
Dharge class : FE Statute : 58.37.8.lb.i.12 
3HO points : 1 
General Offense : SL 2002-173133 
Lnued 
Page: 4 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
For: SN9652 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2002-173133 
Tue, Dec. 10 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
Related text paae(s) 
Document: ASSTG FIELD SUPP 
Author: 144 - Ross, Michael E 
On the listed date and time I responded with other narcotic detectives to 
155 South 400 East apartment 16. I had received a call from a concerned 
citizen that narcotics were being sold from the apartment. 
When I arrived at the apartment I knocked on the door of the apartment. 
The door was opened by Adolph Lucero. I informed Mr. Lucero who I was and 
why I was at the apartment. Mr. Lucero informed me that he rented the 
apartment. I then asked for his permission to enter the residence. As I 
entered I observed a/p Crespo standing in the small kitchen area. I observed 
a/p Crespo attempting to place his hand down his pants. I asked a/p Crespo 
if he could please keep his hands were I could see them while officers were 
present in the home. I then watched as he dropped two small plastic twists 
onto the floor of the kitchen area. The two plastic twists were later found 
to contain cocaine and heroin. The two plastic twists were photographed in 
place and placed into evidence by Salt lake City Narcotic Detective Boelter. 
A/p Crespo was transported to jail by uniformed officers. 
Several other pieces of paraphernalia were located throughout the 
residence. 
Document: PROB CAUSE 
Author: K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Subject: SANTIAGO CRESPO 
Related date/time: Sep-19-02 2301 
A P HAD IN HIS POSESSION ONE SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BLACK TAR 
SUBSTANCE COMMONLY KNOW AS (BLACK TAR HEROIN). A/P ALSO HAD IN HIS 
POSESSION A SMALL TWIST OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A WHITE POWERDY SUBSTANCE 
COMMONLY KNOWN AS (COCAINE). A/P WAS OBSERVED BY UNDERCOVER NARCOTICS 
OFFICERS IN POSESSION OF THESE SUBSTANCES DURING AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION. 
Document: INITIAL R/O FIELD 
Author: K34 - Schneider, Nicholas 
Subject: Knock and talk 
Related date/time: Sep-19-02 2350 
Case n02-173120 and 02-173133 are related to each other. Two a/p's, Pollock 
and Lucero, were issued misdemeanor citation under this case 
number02-173120. A/p Crespo was taken to jail under case 02-173133, for 
possession. 
Sgt Ross received information from a concerned citizen in regards to 
an apartment in her complex, 155 S 400 E #16, that might be pcssibly selling 
or using drugs. Det Boelter and I responded, along with Sgt Ross, to this 
location upon where we did a knock and talk. 
Sgt Ross knocked on the apt and Adolph Lucero (the owner of the apt) 
Continued ... 
5• 5 SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT 
SN9 6 52 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY GO SL 2 002-173133 
Dec. 10 2002 3532 - 0 DRUG-COCAINE POSSESS 
med the door. Sgt Ross asked if the apt was his and he stated that it 
3. He was then asked if we could come in and he stated yes. 
As soon as we walked inside Sgt Ross observed a/p Crespo attempt to 
: his hands down his pants. He was asked to keep his hands where we could 
» them, and once he removed his hands from his pants Sgt Ross observed a>p 
>spo drop two small baggies which were later discovered to be black tar 
-oin and powder cocaine. Also in plain sight was numerous drug 
"aphernalia. See Sgt Ross's supp. 
As I was watching a/p Crespo I observed a/p Pollock pass one of the 
Ler individuals in the apartment something, which appeared to be a pack cf 
ches. Once the item/s was in her hand I saw something fall onto the 
)und and then the female attempted to kick it under the bed. As I looked 
)ser the item/s passed was a small crack pipe (brown in color and aprx 3 
•hes long) and a book of matches. I observed the whole transaction and I 
erved no items in the females hand as a/p Pollock gave her the item/s. 
All the paraphernalia was booked into evidence under case number 
173120 by Det Boelter. Det Boelter booked the cocaine and heroin under 
e 02-173133. A/p Crespo was booked into jail for possession of heroin 
cocaine under case 02-173133. NFD 
ocument: ASSTG FIELD SUPP 
Author: K03 - Emery, John 
Subject: A/P TRANSPORT 
ated date/time: Sep-20-02 0451 
was requested to assist city narcotics officers with the transport of 
s a/p Santiago Crespo to jail. This a/p was transported and booked on 
related charges with out incident. 
ocument: INVSTGTR F/U 
Author: J14 - DeSpain, Amy 
Subject: F/U charges filed 
ated date/time: Oct-02-02 1101 
facts of this case were presented to the da's office for screening. They 
ued an information and a warrant #021911370. These were signed by a 
ge and the warrant was activated by the court. Case closed. 
inued 
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Follow Up Report(s) 
Follow Up # 1 
Assignment Information 
Assigned to J14 - DeSpain, Amy Rank : Detective 
Org unit : SLC Narcotics Squad 
Capacity : Investigate/Case Manager 
Assigned on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) 0823 by J14 - DeSpain, Amy 
Report due on Nov-19-2002 (Tue.) 
Submission Information 
Submitted on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) 1215 
Checked by : 144 - Ross, Michael E 
Approved on Oct-24-2002 (Thu.) by 144 - Ross, Michael E 
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elusion Information 
eneral Information 
Agency : Salt Lake City Proper 
Cleared status : Arrest and/or Charged 
Cleared on Oct-22-2002 (Tue.) by J14 - DeSpain, Amy 

















ited Property Report 
*port Information 
Report Number : 02173133 
Property case status : SEIZED 
Submitted on Sep-20-2002 (Fri.) by Boelter, Tyler 
Authority for disposal : Gibson, Stanley D Org unit : Evidence 
Offense : GO SL 2002-173133 
Location : 155 S 400 E Apartment : 16 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County : Cncl Dist 4 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
Insurance letter received : NO 
General remarks : KNOCK AND TALK 
Related items : 2 
js - Evidence 
1 #: TBI 
.us: SEIZED 
#: 02173133-1 Name: Cocaine-All Forms Except Crack 
\: Powder Quantity: 0.20 
.: GM Value: 
:ription: WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P COCAINE 
)vered Date: Recovered Value: 
[S : X *e 
rs - Evidence 
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Description. BROWN POWDERY SUBSTANCE F.T.P. HEROIN 
Recovered Date.- Recovered Value.-
Flags x *e 
Arrest Information 
Status • CHARGED 
Type of arrest : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only 
Reason for arrest : Other 
Arrest date : Sep-19-2002 (Thu.) 2301 
Arresting officers : K34 - Schneider, Nicholas Arrest agency : S.L.C.PD 
Summary of facts : CG-POSS COCAINE, POSS HEROIN 
Arrest Location 
Civic address : 155 S 400 E 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper County : Cncl Dist 4 
District : A Beat : A12 Grid : CEC 
Arrest Identification 
File number : 13666037 Arrest number : 11563 
Arrestee Information 
Case screened : NO Notify Victim on release: NO Juvenile : NO 
Diversion recommended : NO 
Interpreter needed : NO 
Rights given : NO 
Mental exam required : NO 
Statement taken : NO 
Fingerprinted ; YES Photo taken : YES CD updated : YES 
Family notified : NO 
Lawyer called : NO Meal given : NO Coffee given : NO Arrestee's occupatic 
Detained : NO 
Related General Offense 
GOSL 2002-173133 
Related People 
Arrestee CRESPO, SANTIAGO DIAZ 
Born on Jun-01-1959 
** END OF HARDCOPY REPORT ** 
